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0. Introduction   
The Badminton project (Bycatch and discards: Management INdicators, Trends and locatiON) aims at 
developing the knowledge of discard patterns and factors in European fisheries, evaluating the 
efficacy of selective devices and other discard management measures that have been implemented 
in the past and finally improving methods to analyse, monitor and manage bycatch (unwanted 
catches) and discards in European fisheries. 
WP4 focuses on the socio-economic and institutional factors that influence the discard behaviour of 
fishers. The first step in WP4 was to develop a framework seeing discard as a result of fisher 
behaviour embedded in institutional context, which influences the behaviour. This was developed in 
the working paper D1 in the project (Eliasen and Christensen 2012). The framework was used for 
analysing factors influencing discard behaviours in three case studies; Nephrops trawl fishery in 
Kattegat (Denmark) and Otter trawl fishery in the Ionian and the Aegean Seas (Greece) and an 
English case of three trawl fisheries in NE, NW and SW England. In the D2 report the case studies are 
summarised and the framework and list of factors are evaluated (Eliasen et al. 2012).  
In fact this paper is in draft of a manuscript for a peer reviewed article. This version was presented at 
the ICES Annual Science Conference in Bergen in September 2012. The text has later been revised 
and is expected to be published in the ICES journal of Marine Science in a special issue. The format of 
a manuscript is therefore maintained.  
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ICES CM 2012/C 
Socio-economic and institutional incentives influencing fishers’ behaviour in 
relation to fishing practices and discard  
Søren Q. Eliasen(1), Nadia Papadopoulou (2), Vassiliki Vassilopoulou (2), Tom Catchpole(3) 
 
Discard of unwanted catches are common in in European fisheries. The proposal for reforming the 
CFP by 2013 gives high priority to reduce or even ban discard. Various measures are already in 
use. However, there is no in-depth understanding of the underlying socio-economic and 
institutional incentives and factors causing discard at the individual fisher level.  
The paper presents an approach of seeing discard as result of decisions in the sorting at the deck as 
well earlier in the planning and implementation of the fishing. When the behaviour in the fishing 
practice of decisions results in a more selective fishery than average it could be seen as selective 
behaviour. It is argued that the fishing practise is institutionally embedded in three institutional 
orders; the state (primarily the management system), the market (demand and price formation) 
and the community (norms and identities), which together with natural conditions create 
incentives and frameworks for discard/selective behaviour. Based on this a specified list of factors 
which potentially influence the discards and selective behaviours has been developed. The list is 
applied on three case studies; Nephrops trawl fishery in Kattegat (Denmark) and Otter trawl 
fishery in the Ionian and the Aegean Seas (Greece) and finally an English case of three trawl 
fisheries in NE, NW and SW England. The paper briefly discusses cross case findings of how the 
factors of the list in isolation and together create drivers for discard. Finally the paper evaluates 
the list of factors as a tool for analysing drivers for discard or selective behaviour in a context of 
developing mitigating measures.  
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Introduction 
In fishery it is practically impossible to totally avoid the catch of fish or other organisms which 
cannot be sold or cannot be landed due to legal reasons and is therefore unwanted in the catch 
(Pascoe 1997). The dominant answer to this is to discard the unwanted part of the catch. We here 
define discards as the proportions of both target and non-target catches discharged back 
overboard, either 'live' or 'dead' (Rochet and Trenkel 2005).  
Discarding parts of the catch has different implications depending of the perspective. From the 
assessment perspective it is a problem to get good data on the amount and composition of discards 
(except for discard observations which is quite costly), creating uncertainty in the 
recommendations of allowable catch level. In an economic perspective discards (of marketable 
individuals) are seen as economic waste or waste of human nutrition, whereas environmentalists 
tend to see discard as a waste of biomass and disturbance of the natural balance. Following this, all 
or some parts of the discards are seen as the central problem to be addresses. 
At the political level discards are regarded as a central problem (EU Commission 2007, Kelleher 
2005). But it is dealt with in different ways across management systems. Some Nordic countries 
have prohibited discards, though with some modification (Johnsen and Eliasen 2011), as well as 
Iceland and New Zeeland (Aranda and Christensen 2009, and Christensen 2009). Until now the 
EU has prohibited discards of fish for quota species, which can be landed legally (high grading), 
whereas it is legal to discard non-commercial fish and organisms and even compulsory to discard 
fish, which cannot be landed legally due to minimum landing size or quota regulation. But in 
relation to the 2012 revision of the EU Common Fisheries Policy discard ban is discussed as a 
central element (European Commission 2007 and 2009, Damanaki 2012).  
A discard ban in itself is difficult to police, which is also the experience in the countries with a 
discard ban (Johnsen and Eliasen 2011). In an EU context use of new monitoring technologies (like 
video monitoring) is discussed, often in combination with catch quotas (all catches are registered 
at the quota)1 in order to create an incentive to accept the control measures (Dalskov et al. 2011). 
Whether the discard ban works as a demand-and-control measure or more on a voluntary basis, 
creating incentives for the fishers to reduce the discard within the possible limits is of importance. 
Therefore understanding what creates incentives for changed behaviour is a necessity to support 
the intention of reducing the discard level by using existing or developing new measures.  
 
Discard in the fishing process  
Discards is a by-product of the fishing process. The process of discarding takes place in the sorting 
process on the vessels right after the catch has been taken on board. What is caught is (partly) a 
result of choices made earlier in the fishing process, right up to the trip (choice of gear, fishing 
place and time etc.) and the strategic choices (choice of vessel, investments in quotas and catches 
and dealing with the equipment etc.).  
What is caught is influenced by several choices before and during the fishing. This includes the 
long-term strategic choice of investment in the vessel etc., as well as shorter time tactical choices 
regarding the gear used at the actual trip, the use of it and the choice of fishing time and place 
(Christensen and Raakjær 2006, Eliasen et al. 2008). Here we will mainly focus on the short-term, 
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tactical choices and regard the long-term as a more or less given condition for the individual 
fisher. Though long-term investments buying or selling quotas (in regions where this is possible) 
will be seen as a part of the tactical behaviour to adjust the quota mix to the actual catch.  
Choice of gear is decisive for the catch opportunities, both type of gear (trawl, net, longline etc.) 
and configuration of this (mesh size, grids, pingers, hook size etc.). The gear types differ in 
attraction selectivity (e.g. pots to trawl in nephrops fishery) and contact selectivity (mesh sizes, 
escape windows, grids etc.) (Catchpole and Revil 2008). The way the gear is used also affects the 
contact selectivity; e.g. the effective mesh size of a trawl may change depending on the speed of 
the vessel, which is why the diamond mesh (less dependent of the strength of the pull to size) has 
been implemented.  
The fisher’s choice of fishing time and place is another factor, which influences the catch and the 
selectivity. In a dynamic environment as the sea no one can go directly for fishing with no or very 
little unwanted catch. Though, over time the skipper gathers information about good (or bad) 
fishing places, often combined with information about other factors such as time of the year, 
previous and present weather conditions, even the level of daylight (sunshine/clouded) (Catchpole 
2005). This is central knowledge for the experienced skipper, which is used for optimising the 
landings, but eventually it can also be used for avoiding unwanted catch if this element is recorded 
by the skipper. This factor is reflected in management as closed areas on a permanent basis 
(marine protected areas), in certain periods of the year (e.g. in spawning periods) or temporarily 
closed areas based on fishers information about e.g. many young fish in a certain area, as seen in 
the Scottish fisheries (Scottish Government).  
At deck, other factors influence the choice of discard or holding back the more or less selective 
catch as described by Andersen et al. (2005) and Rochet and Trenkel (2005).  
- Regulations; what can be kept according to the (EU) regulation - minimum landing sizes 
(MLS), general conservation rules, quota rights for the vessel etc. 
- Market factors; what is the commercial value of the fish? Is it perceived at the effort worth 
handling, land and market the fish? Will it take up quota which could be used for higher 
paid individuals? (high grading) etc.   
- Other physical limitations on what can be kept and landed; capacity and skills to handle 
the catch and capacity of storage, ice etc. 
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Figure 1: The main elements of the fishing process, where selective behaviour can be practiced, 
own model.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is discarded is therefore a result of the preparing and catching practice and the sorting on 
deck as illustrated in Figure 1 above. Choices before and during the fishing process which leads to 
a higher selectivity and lower discard than in general in the fishery can be called a “selective 
behaviour” emphasising the importance of behaviour and choices of the fishers in the reduction of 
discards – in parallel with emphasis on the selective gear which is gear developed to a higher 
selectivity in the fishing process relative to the actual used gear.  
 
Institutional embedded behaviour 
How the individual behaviour (and thereby the choices) is influenced by external factors can be 
understood by the institutional theory. As Rudd (2004) emphasises the individual behaviour is 
influenced by perceived incentives of various capitals; natural, manufactured (technology), human 
(knowledge) and social capital. The latter, the social capital, is institutionalised as rules-in-use; e.g. 
formal rules and regulations as well as informal rules as norms and values for specific groups.  
These capitals are anchored in three settings; Community, State and Market characterised by 
different institutional orders (Apostle et al 1998). As ideal types the Community is the lived-in 
human community based on interpersonal ties and egalitarian social networks governed by norms 
and values and social identification (the normative and partly the cognitive institutional pillar 
(Scott 1995). The State is based on formal institutions and structures of law, policy and 
governance, with specific regulations and decision-making procedures (technical and regulative 
measures), communication structures and formal control and enforcement systems. Finally the 
Market is characterised by competition, economic efficiency and (economic) rationality. In the 
real world the three settings interact and consist of different compositions of institutional orders 
ideally addressed to the other settings. As an example the market is an institution with its own 
norms and rules to be followed in order to function (Scott 1995). Apostle et al. (ibid) argues that 
the fisheries develop in the triangle of Community, State and Market. Likewise we will argue that 
the behaviour of the individual should be understood as a result of factors from these three 
settings.   
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Johnsen and Eliasen (2011) argue, in line with the previous that an institutional approach should 
be taken to a complex problem as that of discards. They claim that in order to understand the 
conditions for fisheries management, the natural/ecological conditions should be included as an 
important element. The natural conditions are very dynamic, but external to the individual fisher 
as well as the institutional orders (State, Capital and Market), although in the medium and long-
term they may influence the natural conditions. In parallel the structural conditions for the 
fishery – mainly in form of fixed capital invested in the vessels of the fleet seems as a condition in 
the short run (Christensen & Raakjær 2006), while the structural conditions clearly are 
determined by State, Community and Market in the long run.  
 
Figure 2: The model of the institutional embedded fishing practice. Fishing practise embedded in 
the Community, State, Market interrelation and the natural conditions. 
The model of the fishing practice in the institutional framework intents to grasp the institutional 
analysis at the operational level where the tactical decisions in the day-to-day operations are 
performed.  
 
Factors potentially influencing the selective behaviour  
Claiming the behaviour to be embedded in the institutional triangle we need to identify the 
specific factors which potentially can influence the behaviour leading to discard (or not) in the 
fishing process. The specification is based on the development of Scott 1995. We will argue for 
specific factors within each of the institutional orders which theoretically can influence the 
behaviour leading to a higher or lower discard level. This list of factors will be tested in the case 
studies.   
Natural and structural conditions  
The natural or the ecological conditions in the sea and the targeted fishery are important for 
selectivity and discard. Generally there is a much lower discard level in fisheries targeting fish in 
schools than in fisheries targeting species in a mixed environment in regard species, size and year 
classes. Stock behaviour as natural variations in abundance, changes in position etc. also influences 
unwanted catch and discard. Other natural conditions can influence; sea bed conditions (e.g. limits 
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the use of gear types) or general weather conditions (e.g. waves can influence the functionality of 
the gear and the possibility of sorting and handling the fish aboard).  
Large sums of financial capital are fixed in investments in vessels, equipment and training in 
fishing in a certain way. In a short time perspective the fleet structure is therefore hard to change 
radically and can be regarded as a condition for the individual fisher and therefore a fixed 
condition for behaviour. 
Community  
The community is the social setting which influences the fishing practice. In most situations this 
could more or less be seen as the norms and values of the lived-in community for the fisher as the 
fisheries generally are still located in more or less fishery dependent or dominated communities. 
In some situations though “the community” could be a part of the lived-in community where 
fisheries are dominant or even a less geographic, more social defined community of a certain type 
of fishers, if this community – rather than the physical/geographical community - defines the 
values and norms in use in the fishery.  
The community is mainly the domain of values and norms, but also cognitive elements as 
categories, typifications and meanings. The norms and values are maintained by conformity, 
which creates relatively stable cultural elements and sets conditions for- and limits the individual 
choices and actions. The individual feels a belonging to one (or more) social groups. The group are 
constituted by a set of norms, values, morals and ethical standards, which the individual tends to 
follow to avoid social sanctions. The social sanctions vary from remarks on improper behaviour 
from friends to the exclusion of the individual who does not follow the dominant norms in the 
group (Scott 1995). In general the norms and values are historically based and slowly adjusted to 
fit the surroundings. In this way the norms represent past experiences in the group. These 
experiences are deducted from the specific situations and “sunken” to be the norm or “the way it is 
done”. In that way the sum of experiences is generalised as knowledge within the group about 
how to do, it is institutionalised knowledge. Without being contrasted with other ways to do it, 
the norm is often tacit for those practising it. Still there might be an established basic 
understanding of the norms and institutionalised knowledge related to the discard behaviours 
among the fishers, as this could influence the actual choices (as seen in Nielsen and Mathiesen 
2003).  
While norms are generally sunken, categories, typifications and meanings are negotiated among 
the participants in an on-going and more reflected and cognitive process. In relation to the 
discards and (changed) selective behaviour, learning and redefinitions of the fishers’ roles and 
identities are central. The identity as fisher and especially the role in relation to the management 
system and extraction of nature influence the behaviour – the two extremes could be in the one 
end the fisher as the free extractor of the sea resources, delimited by the management and 
enforcement system, and in the other the fisher as an actor in a larger system with the aim of 
establishing an environmental and economic sustainable resource exploitation. As the role is 
under debate in many relations, one should be aware of the possibility of differences between the 
declared role and the performed role. Therefore the expressed roles should be registered as well as 
the role in practice.  
The fisher’s role in relation to the management system and the discard avoidance can be seen in 
practice in various ways; e.g. in participation in dialogues with management, individual 
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registration of discards in order to learn how to reduce these, collective learning and experience 
exchange with the purpose of reducing discards etc.  
 
 
 
State and regulation  
The setting of the state is the domain of rules and laws. In the EU context the overall policy 
framework is the Common Fisheries Policy. It sets the objectives of the policy, the regulations and 
specific technical measures as well as the rules for how these are decided and communicated.  
The regulations and technical measures limit the conditions for the individual fisher’s actions. For 
a specification it is important to understand the regulative conditions for the individual fisher/the 
group; who are allowed to fish (and eventually how the rights can be transferred), how are the 
limitations implemented in the fishing activity (the specific input and/or output regulation) and 
the supporting technical measures; specification of the gear for the individual fishery, any 
permanent or temporary closing of areas, discard rules (prohibited/compulsory) etc.  
The decision-making procedures regulate the fishers’ influences on the regulative outcome and 
the legitimacy of the regulations. This is highly important for the legitimacy of the regulations 
among the fishers, and probably also for the specific design of regulations and technical measures. 
Thus, in the case studies the formal procedures regarding the decision and design of the tool 
should be surveyed, as well as the fishers’ perception of the process.  
In this regard the specific communication structures between the fishers and the managers are 
important. These structures can carry information both ways; dialogues between fishers and 
management for designing useful technical measures as well as for communicating regulations for 
augmenting the implementation. The communication structures are the formal and the informal 
forums where fishers and managers can meet and discuss experiences of discarding, effects of 
selective gear and measures etc., advisory boards as well as dialogues during control sessions. The 
structures should be seen in a broad sense including the way the communication takes place; is it 
an open dialogue where problems and considerations can be exchanged or are a marking of 
positions and interests.  
Finally an important part is the control and enforcement procedures and implementations. 
Control and enforcement is the tool for securing regulations to be carried out. For most fishers this 
is the main interface to the regulative system. The efficiency of the enforcement of regulations 
influences the fishers’ incentives to follow the regulations, in this regard regulations influencing 
discards.  
Market  
The market can be seen as social structures (Scott 1995, p. 51), characterised by competition, 
economic efficiency and economic rationality. Within this setting, the economic incentives are 
important factors for fishing as an economic activity. For the individual fisher the markets and the 
conditions (what can be sold and which price) are often perceived as given (though often 
fluctuating) conditions within a short-time period. The existence (or absence) of a market is a 
main driver for the choice of fishing activity at all and therefore also important for choice of 
discards (Catchpole et al. (forthcoming). The market signals can be more or less clearly interpreted 
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by the fisher in the various patterns reflecting prices for certain sizes, visible and intangible 
qualities (freshness, sustainability of the fishing and processing etc.).  
The available gear and vessel are seen as a condition for the short-term decisions, which to a 
certain degree locks the fisher to a certain fishery due to his earlier strategic decisions regarding 
investments in the vessel and to a certain degree the gear (Christensen & Raakjær 2006). Radical 
shifts in the fishing methods (e.g. from trawl to net) can imply huge investments for rebuilding 
the vessel as well as learning to handle a new fishery, which can be a barrier to quick changes in 
the fishing methods. Existing equipment and gear also represent fixed capital, but in a minor scale. 
Therefore this can be seen as a field for action rather than a condition for action.  
The concrete factors of the institutional settings (and natural conditions), which might function as 
drivers for the behaviour leading to a high discard level or a low (selective behaviour) are listed in 
Figure 3 below. These factors were tested in the case studies discussed below.  
Figure 3: Specified list of factors which potentially influence the discards and selective behaviours. 
Main area General factors Specific factors 
Natural 
conditions 
Stock related 
conditions 
Mixed/single species fishery 
Natural changes in stock availability 
Condition for the 
fishing process 
Sea bed and other physical conditions 
Weather conditions 
Structural conditions – 
fleet structure 
Fixed investments in vessels (and partly equipment)  
Community  
Dominant norms 
regarding discards 
General view of discard 
Institutional knowledge regarding volumes, consequences 
etc. of the discard 
Social norm enforcement 
Identity The fishers’ perceived role in relation to the management 
system  
Learning The fishers´ interpretation of the management system 
and dialogues with the management regarding the 
discards 
Individual and collective initiatives to learn 
State 
Regulations and 
measurements 
Input/output regulation  
Technical measures 
Decision rules and 
procedures 
Legitimacy of the fisheries regulation 
 
Communication 
structures 
Formal and informal forums 
Communication “climate”  - dialogue/position marking 
Control and 
enforcement 
Interpretation of strength of control and enforcement 
Level of registered non-compliance 
Market   
 
Economic incentives Market prices 
Interpretation of market pressure for certain "qualities" 
Tactical investments 
in technology 
Fishing gear/equipment for tracing, handling and storing 
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Applying the list in case studies 
The list of factors influencing discard behaviour has been used as a check list for a study of fishers´ 
interpretation and behaviour in regard to discard in three trawl fisheries cases in Denmark, Greece 
and United Kingdom. In the same process the relevance of the specific factors of the list were 
tested.  
The case studies were based on desk study and semi-structured interview. Several factual data are 
normally available in a desk study; the natural condition for the specific fishery, the methods and 
elements of regulation of the fishery, the general market conditions of the fishery and the 
composition of the fleet. To some extent behaviour has also been documents; registered discards, 
compliance, general use of gear and fishing places as well as information on local history, 
organisations etc. But other behavioural elements as well as the fishers’ interpretation of discard 
and the various factors (which again influence behaviour) can best be studied by qualitative 
methods. In the Danish and Greek cases semi-structured personal interviews were used, while 
descriptions from interviews conducted in 2009 was used in the English cases. During the 
interview visit observations of behaviour and attributes were also noticed as input for the 
interpretation of the interviews (Schein 2004).  
The semi-structured interviews were conducted in a way that on one hand balances  openness to 
the informant’s associations/answers and on the other hand an agenda for the overall topics of the 
interview, based on Bernard’s ideas for semi-structured interviews (Bernard 1995) and Kvale’s 
writings on dynamic, positive interaction (Kvale 2004). The personal interview was followed by 
an evaluation, considering if the interview provided new information (concepts, reasoning etc.) 
and new perspectives and if crucial information could be questioned in later interviews. Most 
interview persons were contacted for checking the interpretation of the interview and getting any 
supplementing information. The interview persons were not chosen to be representative in a 
statistical sense (Kvale 2004; Wadel 1991; Spradley 1980). The first interviewed persons have been 
strategically chosen from relevance in regard to the chosen fishery (location, gear and target 
species). Often the local chairmen of the fisheries associations pointed at other possible interview 
persons. The actual persons were chosen in order to broaden any further perspectives on the 
themes. The interview lasted 1-2 hours and took place in a fishing locality chosen by the fisher 
(facilities in the port, at the vessel or in some cases private) in order to get as close to the fishing 
environment as possible. The methodology was designed for departing from the everyday practice, 
especially discard practice, which then could be compared to official discard data. This turned out 
to be impossible due to a-four-year time lack of official discard data, which then was useless in 
fisheries with ongoing changes in regulation and therefore in the fishing practice and discard 
pattern.  
 
The cases studies 
Three case studies have been conducted; Danish nephrops trawlers in Kattegat, Greek trawlers in 
mixed fishery in the Ionian and Aegean Seas and in United Kingdom three fisheries; Prawn 
Fishers in NW England, Nephrops trawlers in NE England and Beam trawlers of Devon, South 
West England (Corporate Culture 2010, McArthur & Howick 2010 and Corporate Culture 2009 
and Eliasen et al. 2012 - for description of the three case studies).  
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The Danish case covers the nephrops trawl fishers in Kattegat. The fleet consists of minor trawlers: 
side- and stern trawlers of 10-18 metres with 1-4 crew members including the skipper. The 
trawlers often also hold quota for the neighbouring sea areas, Skagerrak and the Baltic Sea. The 
fishery is mixed with nephrops as the dominant species and sole, plaice and turbot as other 
important species. The traditional target species, cod, today only contributes with 1 % of the 
Kattegat landing value. The Kattegat fishery is regulated by quota on most species: MLS, effort 
regulations as limited days-at-sea and closed areas as well as gear regulations on mesh sizes and 
special trawls with panels, windows, grids etc. An experiment proposed by the fishers of pure 
effort regulation in Kattegat was close to being accepted in 2005, but was given up when a 
national system of Vessel Transferable Quotas (an ITQ-like system) was introduced in 2007. The 
cod recovery plan of Kattegat has put the days-at-sea under hard pressure (as they are supposed to 
be reduced if the cod is not recovering). In 2008 a group of nephrops fishers attempted without 
luck to document low catch and discard of cod in a project of “Selective behaviour” and thereby 
avoid reduction in effort. In order to avoid reduction (and soon closure) of the Kattegat fishery the 
Danish Ministry has documented alternative measures in closed areas, obligatory use of selective 
trawl and fishing pools. The catches are mainly sold via a few larger auctions. A large part of the 
nephrops catches are processed by a few local processing industries and therefore important to 
employment and economy in several local communities. The discard data for 1998-2008 shows a 
50 % discard in weight (and considerable higher in numbers). The main discard is nephrops under 
MLS, with cod and saithe as the next highest volume. The discard seems to be mainly under MLS 
catch, though the discard from saithe could be related to lack of quota. There have been important 
changes in the regulation after 2008, which according to fishers and research indicates a lower 
discard level today. Despite of a high discard, the nephrops stock seems very healthy. The fishers 
accept a regulation system and have been active in shaping it by formulating alternative 
regulations as mentioned above. Newer the less they generally feel stigmatised by cheaters in the 
public. Many have experienced cooperating with science in research fisheries or gear tests and use 
terms from science in describing their understanding of species interaction. Some even refer to 
agricultural terms of maintaining the good bottom for the nephrops by continual trawling and 
feeding the nephrops with discarded material. Explicitly on discard the fishers generally only sees 
discard of commercial species as a problem. There are various approaches to the problem; as an 
ecological problem some discard can be seen as feeding the target species, whereas discard of some 
species is seen as a result of uneven fishery pressure (e.g. closing of industrial fisheries). In 
economic terms discard of marketable fish was not seen as a problem, whereas it is good economic 
sense to discard non-commercial species. The most important discard problem seen from the 
fishers’ perspective is the political focus and the risk of a total discard ban. The fishers feel that 
they have been marginalised in the large society, and other sectors gain importance in their local 
communities. In relation to the general public view on fishers they feel stigmatised as cheaters. 
They claim reluctant to new initiatives, which they expect to be used against them. Nevertheless, 
in practice they show an increasing use of scientific phrases and do cooperate in scientific fishery 
and gear development.  
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The Greek case covers trawlers in mixed fishery fishing from eight major ports in the Ionian and 
Aegean Seas. The trawlers were over 12 metres of length. For the whole trawler group the average 
number of crew are around 7 for the Aegean Sea and 5 for the Ionian Sea, often a Greek skipper 
and Egyptians crew men. The trawlers are doing a mixed fishery with hake as the most important 
species. The Greek trawl fishery is regulated by effort and closed areas, both permanent and 
temporary, minimum landing size (MLS) and gear regulations. A 40 square mesh trawl has 
recently been introduced. There is no TAC or quota regulation, but trawlers are prohibited to land 
species as sardine and anchovy. The discard rates in weight are highly fluctuant in the Ionian Sea; 
registered to be between 70 % and 16 % in 2003-2008, while more stable around 35 % in the 
Aegean Sea. The compliance of the Greek fishermen to the national and EU regulations is 
generally loose, especially regarding the MLS, as the authorities has huge difficulties in monitoring 
the numerous fishing vessels in remote fishing grounds and to impose the regulations. There is a 
considerable marked for small fish, also below the minimum landing sizes, apparently for the local 
fish mongers or restaurants. The discard of marketable fish under MLS seems to be low, whereas 
the most important fraction of discard is non-commercial species.   
The fishers generally accept a regulation system; though they do not agree on all regulations. 
Many have participated in scientific or research fisheries and they seem to expect to be able to 
arrange trade-offs with authorities; i.e. more closed months should be followed by more open 
areas or subsidies. At the same time they fear harder measures without compensations. Based on 
their daily experiences and biological arguments they have developed understandings of species 
interaction, what influences the fishing opportunities etc., which can be heard in discussions of 
themes as discard, interaction with other fishers etc. The fishers sees discard as an unavoidable 
part of the fishing practice in the mixed fishery. The trawl fishers feel that they are rough-handled 
and portrayed as responsible for overfishes stocks, while the coastal fishers are seen as more 
traditional low impact, low income fishers. 
 
The English case covers three trawl fisheries; prawn fishers in NW England, Prawn fishers in NE 
England and beam trawlers of Devon focussing on sole. As the case is based on desk research of 
studies of discard attitudes there’s no detailed description of the fisheries.  
Most of the fishers saw discard as a problem in moral terms, hard work to do and a potential 
danger of ecology and future economy. The fishers distinguish between discard of non-
commercial species, juveniles and over-quota discard. The first two should be avoided as it is hard 
work to discard and discard of juveniles can endanger the stock. These are in some situations 
attempted to avoid by going to other fishing places and other fishing practices. 
For the over-quota discard the fishers see regulation as the problem. There is transferability of 
quota for vessels over 12 metres (mainly within the Producer Organisations). If the problem was 
the quota composition at the individual vessel transferability could reduce the quota related 
discard. But the fishers claim there is a basic mismatch between total quota and the real amount of 
fish. Further there they are reluctant to invest in quota shares, which might be reduced in catch 
value next year. Especially one of the fisheries discarded over MLS fish because of catch 
composition rules, which lead to discard of fish they had quota for, if it was caught in another mix.  
In the three fisheries the fishers in general feel marginalised; one group expressed it as under 
pressure of still harder regulation, another as being seen as criminals although in reality a part of 
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an ancient and innocent tradition of food and jobs to communities. The third group did not feel a 
specific pressure, they were rather to be forgotten and with low public attention. 
Looking across the cases factors from all four main areas; natural conditions as well as community, 
state/regulative and market clearly had important influence at the discard level and pattern. It was 
clear from the interviews and supported by other sources. The differences in the importance of the 
specific factors and not least their interrelation is of more interest.  
It is obvious that there is no common definition of what is the discard problem. There is not 
necessarily fully accordance between the fishers, not even within each case. But they also do not 
know what is meant by discard, when the management system or general public urge them to 
reduce or ban discard. In Greece the fishers hardly saw discard as an issue, while in England and 
Denmark discard was a focus point also because it is a hot political topic and an issue in the 
recovering plans. Still in England and Denmark the fishers only see certain fragments of the 
discard as a problem – an understanding that can differ from other stakeholders as politicians and 
greens. A common understanding of what is the discard problem – or at least clarity of the 
positions – is probably a precondition for cooperation towards reduction of discards. 
There are some discrepancies within the fisher groups on the definition of discard problem. But 
the market conditions are generally decisive for what is the discard problem; discard of fish which 
could be sold is waste. This is the signal from especially the English fishers and can be seen in 
Greece, where market and enforcement conditions allow landing and selling of fish also under the 
minimum landing sizes. The discard of individuals of commercial species but too small to be 
marketed is also often seen as a problem, thus for the future fishery. The fishers’ views of the rest 
of the discard fractions in an ecological perspective are more complex; some are worried about this 
but less about the consequences of other fishery activities, pollution from land or sea, invasive 
species etc. Others see the catch and discard of some species as a way to reduce the predators of 
competitors to the commercial species, and maybe even see the discard as a way to feed the 
commercial species (nephrops).  
The fishers of the English and Danish cases have taken initiatives to develop new regulation tools 
as well as new gear also with higher selectivity, while the same initiatives have not been reported 
from Greece. The explanation is probably mainly the political and managerial focus on discard. 
While there is limited focus on discard in Greece it is an important political issue in England and 
Denmark and an important element in recovering plans in these two countries. Among other 
things by addressing bycatch and discard the fishers try to avoid the regulative measures which 
can treat their fishery.  
Looking across the cases finally illustrate that the effect of one factor often depends on the 
interrelation to other factors. In the Danish case the discard problem of nephrops was due to a 
mismatch between minimum landing size (MLS) and the actual mesh size leading to discard of 
under-MLS nephrops, though at an unclear and most likely lover level than registered, as more 
selective trawls have been enforced after the last year with available data. The current MLS is 
supported by the fishers despite the discard level, as they fear the market will erode if the small 
nephrops reach the market. There was a low level of discard of cod (which is in focus for most of 
the Kattegat regulation). This is a result of both a low abundance of cod to the quota and to the 
transferability of quotas which in an easy way allows fishers to buy supplementing quota rights if 
necessary. The English case covers three fisheries with different problems; though the most 
important discard problems were discard of especially whiting due to a mash match between stock 
abundance and quotas. The lack of total quota means that even a well-functioning quota market 
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cannot reduce the discard level. Further catch composition rules resulted in discard of fish which 
the fishers had quota for, if caught in another catch composition. In the Greek case discard was 
hardly felt as a problem – for fishers or public. Apparently there was a low discard level for all 
marketable species as the market in general accept small sized fish (even below the MLS). A low 
level of control and enforcement of the MLS regulation meant that the discard of marketable 
species was an insignificant problem, whereas non-marketable fish was discarded. These examples 
show that the specific interrelation between stock situation, regulation and market leads to the 
specific pattern; MLS is wanted by the fishers in Denmark and not respected in Greece due to the 
market in both cases. Transferability of quotas reduces quota related discard in the Danish case, 
but cannot in the English cases due to sufficient total quota in one case and not in the other. 
Therefore, the interaction between case specific factors from the three spheres will, if ignored, in 
developing measures make both the final outcome and transferability of measures unpredictable. 
A specific measure in isolation tends to create a certain incentive. But other factors can strengthen 
the incentive or counteract it. In pre-assessments (or evaluations) the whole range should be 
included. 
 
Evaluation of the list of factors influencing discard behaviour 
We have developed a list of factors which can drive the discard behaviour of the individual fisher. 
By focusing on behaviour we see the fisher not as an instrument for drivers, but as an actor in 
developing the specific fishery and therefore also discard pattern. The factors of the list are 
therefore both institutionalised incentives and framework for behaviour. The behaviour can point 
in different directions, but could potentially be used for the purpose of this context; to develop 
mitigating measures to reduce discard. As a tool for mitigating discard the list should therefore be 
seen as a checklist in an analysis of possible drivers for each specific situation. In evaluating the list 
it is important to stress that the specific factors of the list have had various importance in the 
selected cases. Some has not been seen as an influential factor. As the cases are not representative 
for all fisheries, they might influence other cases (not studied here) or might even just need other 
more anthropological methods to be identified as influential.  Therefore the list could be further 
developed when used in other cases.  
The specified factors of the natural conditions were seen in most cases. A higher focus on the 
actual fishing practice could eventually have developed the importance of e.g. weather conditions, 
which were hardly mentioned. Based on the present data we cannot say if this would be more 
than a marginal factor.  
The community factors played important though more intangible roles in the cases. As mentioned 
the norms regarding discards influence the practice, but they would also be the basis for 
mitigating measures or actions. The norm regards the understanding of which fractions of the 
discarded material the fishers see as a problem and what is not seen as such. Another aspect 
concerns the strength of the dominant norm; if it has been developed to a tacit level or there are 
explicit conflicts of defining the norm, seen as social enforcement of the norm on norm-breakers. 
In the cases no examples of social enforcement in regard to discard were mentioned, although 
they could be there, but hidden to an interviewing “stranger”. The identity in relation to the 
management system is a background factor rather than a direct factor on discard behaviour as no 
one sees themselves as “discarders” or “non-discarders”. In these cases the focus on this relation 
revealed that no fishers saw themselves totally in opposition to the management system. Those 
seeing themselves as real partners to the authorities had an expectation of being able to make 
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agreements on certain measurements that the fishers would follow and evaluate before new were 
introduced. They were often disappointed due to a flow of new measures. The learning factor 
could lead to higher or lower discard level – depending of what learning and knowledge are 
focused at. Many of the interviewed persons had participated in research fisheries with scientists 
and used phrases and arguments from science in describing their understanding of the sea 
ecosystems and the influence of fishing and other activities. This learning enables a beginning 
convergence between fishers and science and forms a possible basis for dialogue on discard issues. 
At collective level there were examples in England and Denmark of fisher initiatives to develop 
new selective gear and new management systems which included fisher responsibility to adjust 
the fisheries to avoid certain types of bycatch and discard. No such initiatives were reported from 
Greece.  
The state factors focus on the formal institutional structures as well as the interpretation of these. 
Clearly the choice of input or output regulation influences (no quota related discard in input 
system) as well as technical measures influences discard pattern; the cases revealed several 
examples of discard initiated by technical measures as catch composition rules, minimum landed 
size regulation etc. The Greek case though showed that a low acceptance to the MLS rule, 
combined with low enforcement (and a good market condition for small fish) resulted in low MLS 
related discard of marketable fish. Thereby also decision rules, especially the legitimacy of the 
regulation as well as the control and enforcement status have shown to influence the actual 
discard level and behaviour. The communication structures enable dialogue and learning 
regarding discards. The informal forums are constituted by the interaction between fishers and 
authorities in control or scientists in research fisheries. The formal forums are at an organisational 
level, when fishers’ organisations participate in advisory panels etc. The communication structures 
thus seem to influence discard indirectly only by function as a way to communicate 
understandings of ecosystems and discards (as well as other topics) between the fishers and 
managers/scientists. As a tool for mitigating measures the formal and informal communication 
structures could be of importance for developing and implementing discard reducing initiatives.  
Finally the market factors are of high importance for the discard level and behaviour. Clearly the 
fishers wanted to discard the parts of the catch which could not be landed and sold without a loss. 
The case studies showed that not only auction (or other market) prices are of importance, also the 
risk related to strong fluctuating prices and not least costs. The direct costs of handling, landing 
and selling the catch were considered, but also indirect costs as the work load of handling low 
priced or small quantities of fish which would only bring a low net income. However, it is not 
clear how important the interpretation of risk and indirect costs is for the discard behaviour. 
Surprisingly the market pressure for certified fish eventually caught under low discard was not 
mentioned in the cases as a factor behind changed behaviour. The factor of technical investments 
seems very relevant as the trawl types are a commonly used technical measure in order to reduce 
discard. Other factors as tracing equipment and storing capacity were not mentioned in the cases 
as factors behind discard. Some fishers even declared that in order to limit sorting time and effort 
they preferred some areas with less unwanted bycatch. The cases tend to point at own experiences 
and sharing of experiences within the group as a more important tool to identify areas with lower 
bycatch than tracing equipment.  
As a conclusion the list highlights factors that in isolation, but especially in combination, 
influence discard level and behaviour. Some factors directly influence the present behaviour, 
while others set a framework for an actual behaviour and the basis for any fisher involvement and 
active role in attempts to develop and implement mitigating measures. Some of the specific factors 
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of the list have had less importance in the three case studies (social norm enforcement, handling 
and storing capacity), but could have been important elsewhere. Using the list in the case studies 
also illustrates that some of the factors should be further developed; clarifying the discard/discard 
problem definitions among the stakeholders, the price factor should include interpretation of the 
market and potential net income as this is what influences the discard behaviour. 
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